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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BASEL CONVENTION ON
THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS
OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL
David P. Hackett*
INTRODUCTION
Under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), on March 22, 1989, over 116 nations endorsed the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention or Convention).' The
Convention is designed to provide a global framework for regulating
the movement of hazardous waste across international borders. Al-
though final implementation awaits ratification by twenty signatories,2
there is no mistaking the dimension of UNEP's achievement. Contrary
to the expectations of many observers, UNEP was able to forge an
agreement between nations that had been quarrelling over major provi-
* Counsel, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago office. Previously, Trial Attorney, Envi-
ronmental Enforcement Section, Land and Natural Resources Division, United States
Department of Justice. Haverford College, B.A. 1976, University of Pennsylvania, J.D.
1981.
1. The Convention was endorsed by the 116 attending countries as the Final Act of
the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes. The Conference, held in Basel, Switzer-
land from March 20-22, 1989, was convened by the Executive Director of UNEP pur-
suant to decision 14/30, adopted by the Governing Counsel of UNEP on June 17,
1987. See Basel Convention on the Control on Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal, adopted and opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, re-
printed in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAbiMME, BASEL CONVENTION ON
THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR
DISPOSAL: FINAL AcT [hereinafter BASEL CONVENTION], also reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
649 (1989) (setting out participants and resolutions that address the transportation and
disposal of hazardous waste); see also, Thirty-four Countries Sign Convention on
Transport, Disposal of Hazardous Wastes, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 159 (Apr. 12,
1989) [hereinafter Thirty-four Countries] (discussing in detail some of the waste
transport issues raised by the Basel Convention).
2. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 25, para. 1 (stating that the Convention
takes effect on "the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument
of ratification, acceptance, formal confirmation, approval or accession"). UNEP ex-
pects such ratification by the fall of 1990. Bush Administration to Seek Ratification of
Convention on Worldwide Waste Shipments, 4 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 436 (Sept. 10,
1989). Prior to ratification, an interim secretariat operating under UNEP authority will
oversee implementation of the Convention. UNEP Member Appointed to Assist Waste
Control Convention Secretariat, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 607 (Dec. 13, 1989).
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sions for several years.' Significantly, that dispute had pitted developed
against developing countries, with the developing countries pressing for
more stringent restrictions.4 While some environmental groups have
criticized the outcome as too lenient,5 without question, the Basel Con-
vention represents a substantial attempt to control the global movement
of hazardous waste.
Although an impressive accomplishment, UNEP faces a still greater
challenge ahead. UNEP must now worry about how to implement the
Convention. If the Convention is not or cannot be enforced, it may im-
pair not only UNEP's ability to remedy this problem, but other inter-
national environmental matters as well.
This concern is especially poignant in so far as UNEP has expanded
its role significantly in recent years, tackling complex environmental
3. Western, African Nations Fail to Agree on Transboundary Movement of Toxic
Wastes, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 49 (Feb. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Western, African
Nations] (indicating that the fifteen nations did not agree to a program to prohibit
toxic waste shipments across national frontiers because they were concerned with such
issues as the rights and obligations of transit coastal states in their offshore waters,
liability, compensation, and the environmental standards governing the international
movement of waste); Delegates of 50 Countries Fail to Agree on Draft Covering Move-
ment of Toxic Wastes, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 49 (Feb. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Dele-
gates of 50 Countries] (stating that disagreement over the issue of prior informed con-
sent in relation to transit countries was a major stumbling block to approval of a
convention on hazardous wastes); UNEP Transboundary Transport Draft Bogged
Down Over Prior-Consent Issue, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 660 (Dec. 14, 1988) [here-
inafter UNEP Transboundary Transport] (elaborating on how the developing countries
insisted that no hazardous wastes be transported across their territories unless they
gave their consent); Waste Shipment Incidents Spur Interest in UNEP Agreement to
Deal with Problem, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 471 (Sept. 14, 1988) [hereinafter
Waste Shipment Incidents] (describing how developing countries, particularly the is-
land nations of the Caribbean, were more insistent in their demands for greater protec-
tion of their territorial waters from indiscriminate dumping); Transfrontier Waste 'A
Difficult Issue' Despite Caracas Conference, Long States, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
376 (July 13, 1988) (noting that Bill Long, Environment Director for the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, believed that a world convention on trans-
frontier waste might not occur because of the issue of prior informed consent); Devel-
oped, Developing Countries Disagree Over Elements of Waste Shipment Agreement,
11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 376 (July 13, 1988) [hereinafter Developed, Developing
Countries] (noting that there was disagreement over the issue of how to define a haz-
ardous waste); Mackenzie, Countries at Odds Over Waste Treaty, NEW SCIENTIST,
Nov. 19, 1988, at 19.
4. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. See Legislation on Global Waste Control to Be Proposed by Year's End to Con-
gress, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 425 (Sept. 10, 1989) (elaborating on how Greenpeace
and other environmental groups have criticized the Convention, charging that it legiti-
mizes rather than eliminates the hazardous waste problem); Thirty-four Countries,
supra note 1, at 159 (discussing Greenpeace's denouncement of the Basel Convention
as a "cop out" that promotes the international trade of waste). Greenpeace was con-
cerned about a provision in the Basel Convention that permits countries to enter into
bilateral agreements outside the Convention. Id.
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problems through programs that directly affect nations throughout the
world.6 UNEP has sponsored other substantial environmental conven-
tions, particularly, those relating to ozone and chlorofluorocarbons.7 At
present, much attention is being accorded the issue of global warming
or climatic change.8 Ozone depletion and global warming may be of
greater environmental significance than the international movement of
hazardous wastes.9 The Basel Convention, however, may soon shed
light on the ability of UNEP to implement international environmental
agreements, in large part, because many more nations are likely to par-
ticipate in this Convention than in earlier ones."0 As a result, any defi-
6. See Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14
and Corr. 1 (1972), U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 and Corr., reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1416 (1972) (adopting a Declaration by 113 nations which, among other things, af-
firmed the need to limit the release of toxic substances into the environment); Approval
of Stockholm Conference by the General Assembly, 1972 U.N.Y.B. 330 (creating
UNEP in 1972 as an international environmental entity responsible for promoting in-
ternational cooperation on environmental issues and publicizing emerging environmen-
tal problems of global significance); Institutional and Financial Arrangements for In-
ternational Environmental Cooperation, G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
30) at 43, U.N. Doc. No. A/8730 (1972); Comment, U.S. Controls on International
Disposal of Hazardous Waste, 22 1Nr'L LAw. 775, 784 (1988) [hereinafter Comment,
U.S. Controls on International Disposal] (stating that UNEP functioned chiefly as an
information gathering agency during its early years, and only lately has it begun to
implement guidelines in the area of international environmental policy); Bailey &
Nanda, Export of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Technology." Challenge for Inter-
national Environmental Law, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155, 188-190 (1988) (not-
ing that UNEP's guidelines have focused on the areas of import consent and export
notification requirements); see also infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (acknowl-
edging UNEP's heightened concern over depletion of the ozone layer).
7. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted and opened
for signature Mar. 22, 1985, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) (entered into force
Sept. 27, 1988) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted and opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, re-
printed in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Mon-
treal Protocol].
8. Delegates to UNEP Meeting Say Treaty on Global Change Should Be Top
Priority, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 279 (June 14, 1989); Nanda, Global Warming
and International Environmental Law-A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 HARy. INTL' L.J.
375, 375-76, 385-88 (1989).
9. Nanda, supra note 8, at 375-76, 380-81 (noting that any adverse environmental
impact of hazardous waste exports is limited to those discrete areas that receive the
wastes while ozone depletion and climatic change effects are likely to be much more
global); Kindt & Menefee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion in International
Environmental Law and Policy, 24 TEx. INT'L. L.J. 261, 266-67 (1989); Comment,
Underestimating Ozone Depletion: The Meandering Road to the Montreal Protocol
and Beyond, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407, 408-12 (1989).
10. See Thirty-four Countries, supra note 1, at 159-60 (indicating that all 116
participants endorsed the Convention, although only 34 signed it in Basel); Kindt &
Menefee, supra note 9, at 277, 282-83 (noting that fewer nations participated in the
Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol-18 nations signed the Vienna Conven-
tion and 24 signed the Montreal Protocol).
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ciencies in the Convention should be more readily exposed.
Despite the magnitude of UNEP's achievement, troubling questions
remain about the Basel Convention. Quite simply, the scope of the task
may preclude effective or successful international regulation. This prob-
lem is compounded by the Convention's failure to address several major
implementation concerns. Furthermore, no international forum, includ-
ing the United Nations and the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
has displayed the capacity to enforce an international environmental
agreement. Finally, UNEP does not appear to have resolved its future
role in implementing the Basel Convention. Inevitably, conflicts and
disputes will arise in implementing the Convention. The success of the
Basel Convention, and the fate of future environmental accords, will
turn on UNEP's ability to handle those problems.
I. BACKGROUND
The volume of hazardous waste generated annually worldwide has
increased from roughly five million metric tons in 1947 to in excess of
300 million metric tons in 1988." The overwhelming majority of the
amount of waste generated in 1988-an estimated 265 million metric
tons-was generated by the United States, with another thirty-five mil-
lion metric tons from Western European countries. 2 While the amount
of waste has risen dramatically in the United States and Western Eu-
rope, the expense of adequately disposing of this waste has increased
enormously, in some cases surpassing $2,000 per metric ton. 3 In addi-
tion, space for such waste is on the decline as increasingly strict re-
quirements have prompted many disposal facilities to close, particularly
in the United States.
14
J
11. Tifft, Who Gets the Garbage?, TiME, July 4, 1988, at 52.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Langone, A Stinking Mess, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 45 (explaining that 80%
of the solid waste in the United States is deposited into 6,000 landfills, and that by
1993, 2,000 of those landfills will be closed); Judy, Hazardous Substances in Develop-
ing Countries: Who Should Regulate Foreign Corporations?, 6 VA. J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES 143, 149 (1986) (stating that the increase in industrial pollution in developing
countries has occurred primarily in the area of hazardous waste because public aware-
ness about toxic substances in industrialized nations has caused countries such as the
United States to adopt strict environmental standards); Comment, International Regu-
lation of Transfrontier Hazardous Waste Shipments: A New EC Environmental Di-
rective, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 85, 96 (1986) (noting that the European Community passed
a directive in 1984 to better control transfrontier shipments of hazardous waste) [here-
inafter Comment, A New EC Environmental Directive].
In the United States, the diminution of available sites stems from the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (Supp. 11 1984). The HSWA, passed in 1984, prevents the
[VOL. 5:291
BASEL CONVENTION
Moreover, the "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) philosophy of
nearby residents has prevented construction of many new facilities."
As a result, United States and Western European waste producers have
looked elsewhere to dispose of their waste.
Most of this waste has been handled by transfrontier shipments for
disposal within Europe itself and between the United States and Ca-
nada.16 Facilities in neighboring countries may offer superior technol-
ogy to treat a specific waste or simply have more available room. Be-
cause of the economic benefit derived by more efficient and effective
disposal, the developed countries generally support the continued export
of hazardous waste in the future."
The developed countries also have turned to developing countries for
disposal of hazardous waste in transactions often arranged by waste
brokers. The economics of such disposal allow developing countries to
dispose of hazardous waste at far lower costs, while still providing the
receiving nation with substantial revenue. Because these countries may
be ill-equipped to handle the waste properly, however, the wastes can
present health and environmental problems for the receiving nation.
Even faced with such a prospect, poor countries find it difficult to de-
cline such activities because of the sheer amount of revenue possible.
For example, Guinea Bissau entered into several contracts to receive
American and European wastes over a five year period for $600 mil-
lion, which roughly matches its annual gross national product. 8 Even
disposal on land of hazardous wastes unless the EPA determines that no hazardous
constituents will escape from the buried waste. Id.
15. Easterbrook, Cleaning Up, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1989, at 27, 38; Langone,
supra note 14, at 45.
16. See Waste-Watching, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1989, at 43-44 [hereinafter Waste-
Watching] (noting that East Germany has served as the depository for over one million
tons of household waste from Western Europe); Comment, A New EC Environmental
Directive, supra note 14, at 96 (arguing that transfrontier shipment of hazardous
wastes in Europe is likely to increase). Although there are no published figures availa-
ble, EPA officials estimate that approximately 85% of all exports have been to Canada.
Telephone interview with Wendy Greider, Office of International Activities, United
States Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 10, 1989); See also, Handley, Exports
of Waste from the United States to Canada: the How and Why, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 1061 (Feb. 1990) (discussing how Canada's laws and the economic
and legal factors within the United States result in the United States shipping signifi-
cant portions of its waste to Canada).
17. See Western, African Nations, supra note 3, at 49 (referring to Mostafa Tolba,
Executive Director of UNEP, who commented that the international hazardous waste
trade should not be banned when its purpose is to better preserve people's health and
the environment).
18. Anderson, Dickey, Marshall, Meyer, Obe, & Stanger, The Global Poison
Trade, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1988, at 66-68 [hereinafter Anderson]; EC Rules on
Waste Exports Often Ignored; Ministers Disagree on Tightening Standards, I 1 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 375 (July 13, 1988).
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though Guinea Bissau subsequently canceled the contract (due to pres-
sure from its neighbors), the situation reflects the dilemma confronted
by many emerging nations facing monetary offers to receive hazardous
waste.
The export of hazardous waste to developing countries has created
problems for several reasons. First, a number of exporters have mis-
informed or deceived the recipient country of the true contents of the
waste.' Second, many countries do not possess the necessary technol-
ogy or expertise to properly dispose of hazardous wastes. 20 Third, the
transportation and disposal of hazardous waste itself has been fraught
with problems.
In the past several years, there have been numerous prominent
events, some of which include:
-Mismarked barrels of hazardous waste from Singapore labeled for
a false destination sat unclaimed on a Bangkok, Thailand dock for
years releasing their toxic contents to the environment.
-In Koko, Nigeria, 8,000 improperly marked barrels of hazardous
waste were inadequately stored and they leaked into the environment.
Italy ultimately agreed to repackage the wastes and return them to It-
aly after other countries refused to accept the waste on the Karin B.
-The Khian Sea, carrying municipal ash from Philadelphia, ferried
its waste around the world for several years as nation after nation re-
fused to let it dispose of the waste, before the waste was finally
dumped.2
-The Junior, the Herald of Free Enterprise, and the Olar, each
vessel carrying hazardous waste, capsized at sea releasing their
contents.2'
-The Jelly Wax Company, an Italian waste broker, exported wastes
to Lebanon and Venezuela without first getting permission. The Za-
noobia, carrying some of those wastes, then attempted to dump its con-
19. See Vir, Toxic Trade with Africa, 23 ENV'T SCI. & TECH. 23, 24 (1989) (not-
ing that exporters from the United States falsely labeled hazardous military wastes and
disposed of them improperly in Zimbabwe).
20. See Waste-Watching, supra note 16, at 44 (stating that the waste of most in-
dustrial nations was handled by such countries).
21. Dumping of Philadelphia Ash in Haiti Triggers Furor Among Caribbean Na-
tions, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 189 (Mar. 9, 1988); Ship with Philadelphia Ash
Rejected by Six Countries Disappears Without a Trace, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
325 (June 8, 1988).
22. Action Taken Against Belgium, UK for not Applying Hazardous Waste Direc-
tive, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 496 (Oct. 14, 1987); Freighter Sinkings Prompt Dutch




tents in Djibouti and Syria before being forced to return to Italy.23
-United States exporters falsely labelled hazardous military wastes
and disposed of them improperly in Zimbabwe.
-Radioactive wastes from various European countries and the So-
viet Union have been dumped in Benin without adequate treatment.24
-The Guinea island of Kassa received 15,000 tons of material im-
properly labelled as raw material for bricks. After the death of nearby
vegetation, the wastes were analyzed and discovered to be incinerator
ash.25
-Workers at ports in the United Kingdom declined to unload PCB
waste shipped from Canada for incineration in the United Kingdom.
As a result of such events, the Organization of African Unity passed
a resolution in 1988 condemning the disposal of hazardous wastes in
Africa and demanding that those responsible clean up the wastes.26
Several member nations have enacted laws penalizing the unlawful dis-
posal of hazardous waste, most notably Nigeria, which has threatened
to impose the death penalty for improper disposal.21
The amount of hazardous waste exported either globally or to devel-
oping countries is unknown.28 Furthermore, the consequence of such
exports is equally elusive. Nevertheless, the events discussed above evi-
dence the existence of at least some problems, and more importantly,
the perception of such problems. Due to these events, environmental
groups such as Greenpeace and the Natural Resources Defense Council
have called for a ban on all exports of hazardous waste.2" A ban on
exports, however, may be counterproductive. Economic efficiencies may
23. Vir, supra note 19, at 25.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 24.
26. Id. at 25; Congressional Inquiry Scheduled into Disposal of U.W. Waste
Abroad, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 378 (July 13, 1988).
27. Greenpeace Calls for World Ban on International Traffic in Waste, 11 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 433 (Aug. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Greenpeace Calls for World Ban];
Developed, Developing Countries, supra note 3, at 376.
28. Thirty-four Countries, supra note 1, at 160-61. The size of the global waste
trade is a controversial subject. Western, African Nations, supra note 3, at 50. Even
UNEP lacks an accurate figure. Id. Jan Huismans, leader of UNEP's International
Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals, asserts that West Germany itself exports
60,000 metric tons of waste annually. Waste Shipment Incidents, supra note 3, at 472.
A 1988 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimate
indicated that 300,000 metric tons of waste had been exported from Western Europe
since 1983. Greenpeace Calls for World Ban, supra note 27, at 433. At least 11 devel-
oping countries have accepted waste from the United States and Europe since 1986. Id.
Official estimates indicate that over 600,000 tons of hazardous waste are exported
yearly from OECD nations, with about half of that originating from Western Europe.
Waste-Watching, supra note 16, at 44.
29. Greenpeace Calls for World Ban, supra note 27, at 433-34.
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be achieved through disposal at foreign sites. Moreover, exports to
these foreign facilities may provide for more environmentally protective
disposal because they may be better equipped to handle certain wastes.
Additionally, sovereignty rights of individual countries may be sub-
verted if they are forbidden from electing to receive such wastes.30 For
these and other reasons, the world community has chosen through
UNEP to regulate rather than ban exports of hazardous wastes.
II. PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO CONTROL HAZARDOUS
WASTE EXPORTS
The Basel Convention is a product of the prior efforts of various gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental organizations to regulate the export of
hazardous wastes. Those programs provided the framework and raised
issues that shaped the debate within UNEP, and ultimately, the out-
come of the Convention. Accordingly, those experiences are significant
in understanding the evolution of the Convention and analyzing its
prospects for success.
A. UNITED STATES REGULATION OF THE EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE
3 1
Pursuant to a statutory directive, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the export of hazardous wastes
from the United States.3 2 These requirements prohibit the export of
hazardous waste without prior written consent of -the receiving coun-
try.3 Furthermore, exports must be made in accordance with detailed
requirements designed to track the movement and disposal of such
30. Delegates of 50 Countries, supra note 3, at 49 (recognizing that developing
countries may well wish to avail themselves of the financial benefit of such transactions
to modernize their economies, while postponing until a later date the environmental
consequences of doing so). Although others may object to such a decision, sovereignty
rights enable a nation to accept wastes. Id.
31. See, e.g., Semenoff, Foreign Trade in Trash? Exporting Hazardous Waste, 4
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 14, 14-17, 44-46 (1989) (setting out the current United
States statutory requirements for exporting hazardous waste); Comment, U.S. Controls
on International Disposal, supra note 6, at 775-90; Comment, A New EC Environmen-
tal Directive, supra note 14, at 119-27 (contributing to the discussion of the United
States government's program to regulate hazardous waste shipments).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. 11 1984); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50-.57 (1988). An export
must comply with the extensive manifest requirements of 40 C.F.R. 262.70 through
262.23. 40 C.F.R. § 262.54 (1988). An export must also comply with all transportation
of hazardous waste requirements set forth in part 263 of volume 40 of the Code of
Federal Regulations. Id. § 262.52.




Notwithstanding these requirements, occasionally, export of waste
from the United States has been controversial-as typified by the infa-
mous odyssey of the vessel Khian Sea35 -and undesirable in the eyes of
developing countries.
1.. The Export Program
In 1976, the United States Congress enacted the Resources Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 36 which provides an extensive "cra-
dle to grave" regulatory system for tracking hazardous waste from gen-
eration through disposal. EPA regulations implementing RCRA
provide extensive rules for the generation, treatment, storage, transpor-
tation, and disposal of wastes.3 7 Central to the RCRA regulatory pro-
gram is a manifest system that requires tracking of a particular waste
throughout its life by way of uniform documents that must be filed
with the government.3 8 A document describing the waste, known as the
Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest, must accompany the waste at all
times.39 Failure to comply with these requirements can subject the
waste handler to substantial civil and criminal penalties.
40
EPA's definition of hazardous waste includes those substances that
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c) (Supp. 11 1984); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50-.57 (1988). A pri-
mary hazardous waste exporter must inform the EPA of a planned export at least 60
days before the first shipment of that export. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3. The notification must
contain the following information: (1) an account of the type of hazardous waste and
the EPA hazardous waste number; (2) the estimated rate at which the hazardous waste
is to be exported and the time span over which such waste is to be exported; (3) the
estimated amount of such waste; (4) all foreign ports of entry and departure; (5) a
discussion of the method of transportation for each shipment of such waste; (6) an
account of the way such waste will be handled in the receiving country; and (7) the
name and address of the final treatment, storage, or disposal facility. Id.
35. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the world travels of Phil-
adelphia municipal ash).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (Supp. 11 1984).
37. See 40 C.F.R. § 260-265 (1988) (defining the rules for the identification and
listing of hazardous material, the standards for hazardous waste transporters and pro-
ducers, and the standards for operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities).
38. See id. §§ 262.20, 263.20, 264.70, 265.70 (requiring the Uniform Hazardous
Waste Manifest to describe the waste, the container, the quantity, and the facility of
storage). The Manifest must originate with the waste generator, pass to the trans-
porter, and then be accepted by the accepting facility.
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (Supp. 11 1984). The EPA may, pursuant to an order assess-
ing a civil penalty, suspend or revoke a hazardous waste handler's permit or demand up
to a $25,000 per day penalty. Id. A person who is convicted of violating any provision
of section 6928(d) can be sentenced up to two years in prison, or be fined up to
$500,000 for each day of the violation. Id. § 6928(d).
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EPA has specifically listed as hazardous (for example, specific wastes
generated by particular industries) and wastes that fail certain tests
pertaining to the characteristics of the waste itself (for example,
ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity).41 There are a few ex-
ceptions, although small quantities of the hazardous wastes are mini-
mally regulated.42 As a result, thousands of wastes fall within this ex-
pansive definition and are subject to the RCRA regulatory program.
Pursuant to its general RCRA regulatory authorization, EPA
promulgated regulations governing 'the export of hazardous waste in
1980."3 When Congress amended RCRA in 1984, it added require-
ments specifically governing the export of hazardous waste to foreign
countries." This amendment modified EPA's existing export program
requiring the consent of the importing country before any export of
waste.45 It also expressly provided that a copy of the consent document
must be attached to the manifest accompanying each shipment of
waste."
EPA has now adopted new regulations implementing the RCRA re-
quirements.47 The export requirements apply to all exports of waste
which the RCRA defines as hazardous. 48 To export hazardous waste, a
party49 must provide EPA with advance written notification of the ex-
port.50 The export notice may cover multiple shipments of that type of
waste for a twelve month period. 5 This notice must occur sixty days
41. 40 C.F.R. § 261 (1988).
42. See generally, id. § 261.5 (defining small quantities of hazardous waste as no
greater than 100 kilograms per month).
43. 40 C.F.R. §§ 262-263 (1988). The 1980 export regulations required an ex-
porter to notify EPA each year before the initial shipment of the waste. Id. § 262.53.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. I 1984).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50-.57 (1988).
48. Id. § 261.3 (defining a hazardous waste); Comment, U.S. Controls on Interna-
tional Disposal, supra note 6, at 781 n.59 (noting that spent industrial ethyl alcohol is
exempt from EPA domestic regulation, but not from the export requirements).
49. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(A) (1988). The "primary exporter" must provide the notifi-
cation before such waste is scheduled to leave the United States. Id. A "primary ax-
porter" refers to the party exporting the waste or to the broker arranging for disposal
in a foreign nation, and not to the transporter of the waste. Id.
50. Id. The notice must describe: the waste (including the EPA hazardous waste
number, Department of Transportation proper shipping name, and the hazardous
class); the frequency of export and the time period over which it will occur; the total
quantity of the waste; all ports of departure and entry; a description of the means of
transport; the volume of disposal; the name of the receiving party; and the name of any
transit country through which the waste will pass and the length of storage in that
transit country. Id. § 262.53(a)(2)(i-viii).
51. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(a) (1988).
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before the exporter intends to move the waste off-site. 2
After receiving a complete notification,53 EPA and the United States
Department of State contact the receiving country and request ap-
proval to export the waste. 54 As part of that notice, EPA provides the
receiving nation with copies of applicable regulations governing han-
dling of that waste in the United States. Once the receiving country
has consented in writing, EPA provides the exporter with the consent,
including any requirements imposed by the feceiving country on receipt
or disposal of the waste.55 The waste may then be exported subject to
RCRA manifest requirements.56 First, the written consent must accom-
pany the waste at all times after export.57 Second, the transporter must
comply with RCRA transport requirements.58 Third, the exporter must
make conscious efforts to determine if the waste arrived at its proper
destination.59 Finally, the exporter must confirm that the waste arrived
at the designated facility.60 If the waste does not arrive or it arrived
with some discrepancy from the manifest, the exporter must file an ex-
ception report with EPA,61 retain records relating to the export, 2 and
file an annual report identifying the total amount of waste it handled in
that year.63
A waste may also be exported to a nation if the United States has
entered into a bilateral agreement with that nation regarding such ex-
52. Id.
53. Id. § 262.53(e) (1988). The EPA determines when the application is complete.
Id. If a request for confidentiality is made to protect trade secrets, the application is
not complete until the claim is resolved pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 260.2. Id.
54. Id. § 262.53(e) (1988).
55. Id. § 262.53(f) (1988). The EPA will also notify the primary exporter of with-
drawal of a prior consent or of any responses from transit countries. Id.
56. Id. § 262.54 (enumerating exceptions to general manifest requirements of 40
C.F.R. §§ 262.2-.23).
57. Id. § 262.52(c) (requiring consent also to be attached to the manifest unless
exported by rail or water).
58. Id. § 262.50 (requiring transporters to comply with 40 C.F.R. § 263).
59. Id. §§ 262.54(), 262.55. The primary exporter must require the consignee to
confirm in writing the delivery of hazardous waste to that facility and to describe any
significant discrepancies between the manifest and the shipment. Id. § 262.54(0.
60. Id. 8 262.54(f). An exception report must be filed if certain conditions are not
met. Id.
61. Id. §§ 262.54-.55.
62. Id. § 262.57.
63. Id. § 262.56. The annual report must summarize the types, quantities, fre-
quency, and ultimate destination of all hazardous waste exported during the previous
year. Id. The annual report must also contain a description of the efforts undertaken
during the year to reduce the volume and toxicity of waste generated and a description
of the changes in volume and toxicity of waste actually achieved during the year in
comparison to previous years. Id.
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ports." An exporter must still provide written notice to EPA prior to
an export. The bilateral agreement, however, provides the consent, so
that written consent need not be obtained. To date, the United States
has entered into such agreements with Mexico and Canada,", and gov-
ernment officials have announced plans to increase the number of
agreements."6
2. Problems with the Export Program
Implementation of this export program has revealed several major
problems. Various bills have been introduced and hearings held to ad-
dress these deficiencies.6 7 The most important problem involves the is-
sue of identifying the waste and activities that are subject to the re-
quirements of the program. The export regulations only apply to wastes
that EPA has defined as "hazardous" under RCRA.6 8 Although the
United States has an expansive definition for such wastes, 69 various
wastes in need of regulation have escaped the definition's scope. For
example, wastes such as the incinerator ash carried by the Khian Sea"0
64. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (Supp. 11 1984).
65. Agreement on the Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Haz-
ardous Substances, United States-Mexico, opened for signature Nov. 12, 1986, re-
printed in 26 I.L.M. 25 (1987) (enters into force upon exchange of notes stating that
each party has completed its necessary internal procedures); Agreement Concerning
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste, United States-Canada, opened for
signature Oct. 28, 1986, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 593 (1987).
66. Thirty-four Countries, supra note 1, at 159-61; U.S. Would Tie Waste Exports
to Bilateral Agreements, Thomas Says, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 472 (Sept. 14,
1988) (stating that bilateral agreements would be the basis for the export of toxic
waste under an approach being considered by the United States, rather than shipment-
by-shipment determinations as is now the case).
67. See H.R. REP. No. 5434, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (forwarding a bill to
ensure that solid waste exported from the United States to foreign countries is man-
aged to protect human health and the environment); H.R. REP. No. 2525, 101st.
Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) (putting forth a bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to
ensure that any solid waste exported from the United States to foreign countries is
managed to protect human health and the environment); see also Bush Administra-
tion, supra note 2, at 437 (stating that the Bush administration has repeatedly stated
that it intends to introduce legislation consistent with the Convention). Although the
Bush administration did not introduce legislation by the end of the year, the remaining
obstacle to such legislation (the definition of recycled) was resolved, laying the ground-
work for the legislation. EPA Decides Against 'Recycling Definition'for Waste Export
Bill, INSIDE EPA, Dec. 15, 1989, at 12-13.
68. 40 C.F.R. § 262.50 (1988).
69. Id. § 261.3.
70. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of disposing
of the Philadelphia municipal ash). In fact, two recent cases affirmed that ash remain-
ing after the incineration of household waste is exempt from regulation if the facility
meets specific criteria. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Chicago, Civ. No. 84-C-
3045, 30 E.R.C. 1624 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1989) (1989 WL 154009); Environmental
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are not defined as hazardous and are therefore not subject to the export
regulation program. Thus, even with the extensive United States regu-
latory export program, certain dangerous wastes have fallen outside
regulation.
Another problem is the different treatment the RCRA affords to
small quantities of wastes. If the amount of the hazardous waste does
not exceed a certain established minimal quantity, the regulatory pro-
gram, including export requirements, is not applicable to the same ex-
tent.71 Furthermore, the RCRA regulations do not apply to an entity
that is "recycling" rather than disposing of hazardous waste.7 2 It is not
always clear into which group a waste should be classified.
In addition, EPA's role in the export process is inadequate. Its func-
tion is limited to a ministerial task: to ensure that notice has been
given. The agency does not substantively evaluate the waste, nor does it
assess the capacity of the receiving facility to treat the waste. Instead,
EPA merely certifies that the relevant foreign country has consented to
receipt of the waste. 3 Moreover, EPA's export oversight program has
not even accomplished that limited task. The program was described by
the EPA inspector general at Congressional hearings in 1988 as in
"shambles. '74 The program is inadequately staffed to identify exporters
who fail to completely analyze or list the constituent elements of the
waste being shipped, or to determine the capacity of the receiving facil-
ity to dispose of that waste. EPA also may be failing to observe many
illegal exporters who are exporting without any notice to EPA or the
importing country. In short, enforcement of the program is lacking.
Finally, the regulatory program requires only that the receiving
country consents to receipt.75 Transit countries receive notice of the
transport of the waste, but their prior consent is not necessary for any
shipment.7 6 Thus, a shipment could pass through a transit country
before that country has had an opportunity to evaluate the appropriate-
ness of such activity. However, recent shipping events, particularly oil
spills, reveal the vulnerability of a transit nation to accidents.
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725 F. Supp 758, 30 E.R.C.
1609 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1989).
71. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (1988).
72. See id. (referring to small quantity generators); id. §§ 261.1-.2, 261.6 (refer-
ring to recycled materials).
73. Id. §§ 262.52-.53.
74. Anderson, supra note 18, at 68.
75. 40 C.F.R. § 262.52 (1988).
76. Id. §§ 262.50-.57.
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B. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REQUIREMENTS 77
The European Community (EC) member states7' generate roughly
thirty-five million metric tons of waste annually, of which ten to fifteen
percent is disposed of in countries other than the ones generating the
waste. 9 To handle the extensive movement of hazardous waste, the EC
has adopted requirements governing such shipment. Because its mem-
bers support such shipments, the EC program also regulates rather
than bans export of hazardous waste.
I. The Export Program
Two directives8" underlie the EC regulation of hazardous wastes: the
1975 Directive on General Principles of Waste Disposal (1975 Direc-
tive) and the 1978 Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Wastes (1978
Directive).8" The 1975 Directive requires Member States to ensure that
waste is disposed of without harm to human health or the environment.
Member States are to develop disposal plans, create permissible sys-
tems for transportation, implement storage and disposal facilities, and
77. See Lomas, Environmental Protection, Economic Conflict and the European
Community, 33 MCGILL L.J. 506, 515-32 (1988) (discussing the dynamics of the in-
ter-relationship between the environmental and economic policies of the European
Community); Kramer, The Single European Act and Environment Protection: Reflec-
tions on Several New Provisions in Community Law, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 659-
88 (1987) (analyzing the procedure for implementing the EC environmental provi-
sions). See generally, Comment, A New EC Environmental Directive, supra note 14, at
95-115 (discussing the development of the EC Directive on Hazardous Waste, focusing
on the Final Directive of 1984).
78. The EC consists of twelve member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. Single European Act, opened for signature Feb. 17, 1986, reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986).
79. Comment, A New EC Environmental Directive, supra note 14, at 96.
80. Three kinds of actions are binding upon EC members: regulations, directives,
and decisions. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 G.R. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-1I) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
art. 189 (1958) (unofficial English trans.). A directive prescribes the general require-
ments that each member country is to incorporate into its own nation's laws within a
set period of time. Id. The individual nation has the discretion to decide what form or
method it shall use to satisfy the result to be achieved. Id. If a Member State fails to
implement a directive, or does so inadequately, another Member State may bring an
action against the Member State in the European Court of Justice. Id. art. 170. A
regulation has general application and each Member State must comply with the exact
language and requirements. Id. art. 189. A decision is binding upon the particular en-
tity-state or individual-to whom it is addressed. Id.
81. Counsel Directive on General Principles of Waste Disposal, 18 O.J. EuR.
Comm. (No. L 194) 39 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Directive]; Directive on Toxic and




track the movement of hazardous wastes." The 1978 Directive identi-
fied twenty-seven generic types of waste and required member states to
provide for proper transportation, treatment, and disposal of such
wastes.8 3 In general, however, the 1978 Directive left it up to each
member state to define hazardous waste and to develop its own regula-
tory system."
In 1984, the EC adopted a directive (1984 Directive) regarding the
transfrontier movement of hazardous waste within the EC and of that
exported to nations outside the EC.85 In general, the 1984 Directive
establishes a compulsory notification and tracking system of hazardous
wastes. In 1986, the EC amended the 1984 Directive to allow export of
waste to non-EC countries only after the receiving country agrees to
accept it and demonstrates a capacity for handling the hazardous
waste.88
Before an EC country may export a hazardous waste, the holder of
the waste must notify the receiving, exporting, and transit nations of
the shipment. 7 Notification is made through a "uniform consignment
note," which is similar to the manifest in the United States system.88
The note provides information about the waste, its destination, its
route, and its source;89 it also indicates if any insurance coverage ap-
plies to the shipment 0 In addition, the holder of the waste must
demonstrate a contractual relationship with the ultimate recipient of
the waste, who, in turn, must have the capacity to handle the waste. 1
82. 1975 Directive, supra note 81.
83. 1978 Directive, supra note 81.
84. Id.; see Parliament Condemns Commission's Failure to Ensure Implementa-
tion of Waste Directive, 7 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 132 (1984) (detailing the problems
of implementation of the directives as a result of allowing the Member States to de-
velop their own regulatory systems).
85. Council Directive on the Supervision and Control Within the European Com-
munity of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste, 27 OJ. EUR. CoNInt. (No.
L 326) 31 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Directive].
86. Council Directive of 12 June, 1986 Amending Directive 84/631/EEC on the
Supervision and Control Within the European Community of the Transfrontier Ship-
ment of Hazardous Waste, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 181) 13 (1986) [hereinafter
1986 Directive].
87. 1984 Directive, supra note 85, at 33.
88. Compare id. art. 3(2) (requiring notification to be provided by means of a uni-
form consignment note) with 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.52-.54 (requiring notification by means
of EPA Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest Form).
89. 1984 Directive, supra note 85, annex 1. The notification is divided into five
parts: (1) notification information; (2) acknowledgement by member states; (3) infor-
mation on transport arrangements; (4) acknowledge waste by the ultimate disposer,
and (5) customs endorsement for waste shipped outside of the European Community.
Id.
90. Id. art. 3(3).
91. Id.
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The holder may not ship the waste unless the receiving country has
provided consent.2 A receiving EC country may condition receipt of
hazardous wastes, although if the exporter satisfies the conditions, the
country may not reject the waste. Similarly, transit states may not
ban shipments through their territory, but they may impose conditions
on the shipment. Finally, once a shipment has been authorized, the
holder must package and label the hazardous waste in accordance with
the 1986 Directive requirements, identify the nature, composition, and
quantity of the waste, and provide accident instructions. 4
The 1986 Directive does not require producers, shippers, or disposers
of hazardous waste to submit annual reports; however, they must retain
records of hazardous waste exports. 5 Each EC member state must also
submit biennial reports regarding the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous waste within that nation.9
2. Problems with the Export Program
Implementation of the hazardous waste export program has encoun-
tered several major problems.9 7 First, the EC member states have been
extremely slow adopting the necessary implementing legislation and
regulations. As of the fall of 1988, most EC members had not enacted
the necessary statutes to implement the 1984 Directive. 8 The failure of
92. Id. art. 4 (stating that a transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste covered by
the Hazardous Waste Directive may not be executed before the competent authority of
the member state has acknowledged receipt of the notification).
93. Id.
94. Id. art. 8(1).
95. Id. art 13. These records must contain information on: (1) "shipments of waste
arising from major accidents"; (2) "any significant irregularities in transfrontier ship-
ment of waste covered by this Directive which has involved or may yet involve serious
hazards for man or the environment"; and (3) the quantity and type of waste imported
to and exported from the member state. Id.
96. Id.
97. Parliament Condemns Commission's Failure to Ensure Implementation of
Waste Directive, 7 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 132 (May 9, 1984).
98. Clinton Davis Hits Lack of Enforcement as Contributing to 'Democrats Defi-
cit', 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 580 (Dec. 13, 1989); Clinton Davis Demands Nine
Countries Carry Out EC Toxic Waste Export Legislation, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
469 (Sept. 14, 1988) (discussing how Clinton Davis, the European Community's Envi-
ronmental Affairs Commissioner, urgently demanded rapid nation implementation of
European Community legislation on toxic waste exports); EC Rules on Waste Exports
Often Ignored; Ministers Disagree on Tightening Standards, 11 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 375 (Sept. 14, 1988) [hereinafter EC Rules] (detailing how European Commu-
nity Commissioner proposed steps to curb the abuses including: implementing Euro-
pean Community Directives 84/631 and 86/279 with "maximum stringency"; supervis-
ing their full implementation; proposing stronger implementing requirements; and




the members to adopt implementing language is significant in that the
1984 Directive itself has no binding effect on an exporter of hazardous
waste. Each member country must impose requirements to regulate the
export of hazardous waste. As a practical matter, therefore, for the
past several years, exporters of hazardous waste in the EC have not
been subject to limitations on the transfrontier movement of hazardous
waste.
The 1984 Directive makes the definition of hazardous waste discre-
tionary for member states. Although the 1984 Directive identifies a list
of hazardous wastes, each individual country is to determine what
quantity and concentration of the listed waste constitutes a hazardous
waste. In fact, most countries have defined such wastes differently. As
a result, there has been considerable confusion and little uniformity in
application of the program throughout the EC. 9 Such lack of definition
throws the whole program into disarray. Some countries have pointed
to such inconsistencies and other potential problems to justify their fail-
ure to implement the 1984 Directive. 100
Not surprisingly, the EC has proposed to modify its 1984 Directive
to address the problems posed by inconsistent and different definitions
of hazardous waste within the EC, and to modify its notification
scheme.101 The EC proposed to modify its program to clarify the defini-
tions of the terms hazardous waste, mixtures, and disposal.0 2 It would
define hazardous waste by listing precise criteria in terms of materials
and properties of the waste.10 3 In addition, the EC has proposed to cre-
ate an EC wide information bank which would track wastes and the
capacity of various facilities to handle certain types of waste.10 Finally,
99. ECC to Revise Notification Scheme for Transboundary Shipment of Wastes,
12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 531 (Nov. 8, 1989) [hereinafter ECC to Revise Notification
Scheme].
100. Britain to Pressure EC Member States for Clarification of Movement of
Wastes, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 443 (Sept. 13, 1989) [hereinafter Britain to
Pressure].
101. ECC to Revise Notification Scheme, supra note 99, at 531-32, Environmental
Ministers Fail to Agree on Proposal to Amend Waste Directive, 12 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 484 (Oct. 11, 1989); EEC Looking at Waste Control Methods. Including Revi-
sions of Existing Directives, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 478 (Oct. 11, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter EEC Looking]; Claveloux, Tighter Control of Waste Management. Disposal of
Toxic Waste Envisioned in Proposals Made by European Community Commission, II
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 449 (Aug. 10, 1988); EC Rules, supra note 98, at 375. The
European Community is concerned that different definitions of hazardous waste will
result in different standards and thus unequal competition within the market. To date,
the EC members have been unable to reach agreement on these matters.
102. EEC Looking, supra note 101, at 478-79.
103. Claveloux, supra note 101, at 449-52.
104. Id.
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the EC has proposed to clarify its enforcement authority to enable
member states to punish violators and to enforce the requirements of
transfrontier movement of hazardous waste.'05
C. OECD REQUIREMENTS
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) 10 6 has adopted several decisions and recommendations con-
cerning the export of hazardous waste. 10 7 In its first action relating to
transfrontier movement of hazardous waste, the OECD directed each
of its members to control the movement of hazardous waste and ensure
that authorities in countries affected by the waste are provided with
adequate and timely information about the wastes.'0 8 The OECD fur-
ther recommended that for transactions between member states, an
agreement from the receiving nation should precede export and the ex-
porter is to provide information on the origin, nature, composition, and
quantity of the waste.'0 9
Subsequently, the OECD extended the same program to exports to
nonmember countries. The specific requirements for its members are:
first, to provide for authority to prohibit exports when necessary; sec-
ond, to apply controls to non-OECD countries at least as stringent as
those applicable to OECD members; third, to prohibit export of haz-
ardous wastes to non-OECD countries without consent of the country
and without notice to transit nations; and fourth, to prohibit the export
of hazardous waste to non-OECD members, unless the wastes are to be
disposed of at an adequate disposal facility." 0 The OECD's definition
of hazardous waste adheres to the definition given to the term by the
105. Id.
106. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1961).
OECD members include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
107. Comment, U.S. Controls on International Disposal, supra note 6, at 780 n.52
(stating that OECD decisions are binding on its members, recommendations are not);
see infra notes 108-13 (discussing the several OECD legislative actions concerning the
export of hazardous waste).
108. Decision and Recommendation of the Council on Transfrontier Movements of
Hazardous Waste, OECD Doc. C(83) 180 (Feb. 13, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 214
(1984).
109. Id.
110. Council Decision-Recommendation on Exports of Hazardous Wastes from




country through or to which the waste was going."11 In 1988, the
OECD modified its definition of hazardous waste to include a core
group of specifically listed wastes. 1 2 In addition, hazardous waste re-
fers to any waste defined as hazardous by the exporting or importing
member country. 13
The OECD program prescribes general guidance, but does not spec-
ify the details for its implementation. As a result, considerable debate
has surrounded the scope of the program's requirements.11 4 For exam-
ple, similar to the United States manifest1 5 and the EC consignment
note,116 the OECD program calls for tracking documentation. There
has been much discussion about the form of such documentation.
Similarly, as with other export programs, much debate surrounded
the extent and type of notification to be provided to transit and import-
ing countries. Although the OECD program calls for consent before
shipment, the nature of such consent is unclear. Potentially, it could
include: prior informed consent (actual consent); prior informed choice
(implied if no response within a certain time period); or prior notifica-
tion (right to reject wastes only if required by laws of importing coun-
try). Because of the volume of transfrontier shipments of hazardous
waste to other OECD members, prior informed consent could be dis-
111. Id. at 1,013.
112. Council Decision on Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes, OECD
Doc. C(88) 90 (May 27, 1988) reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 257 (1989).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Canadian Officials Confused by U.S. Position on Negotiating Acid
Rain Treaty, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 115 (Feb. 10, 1988); Pace Slow on Proposed
OECD Agreement on Transfrontier Toxic Waste Movement, 11 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 220 (Apr. 13, 1988); OECD's Environmental Focus Remains on Four Major
Areas, Environmental Chief Says, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 282 (May 11, 1988);
Group Proposes Notification Procedures for Trans-border Hazardous Waste Ship-
ments, 10 Int'l. Env't Rep. (BNA) 57 (Feb. 11, 1987); OECD Policy Group Backs 30-
Day Notice on Transfrontier Hazardous Waste Exports, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
154 (Apr. 8, 1987); OECD System on Transborder Waste Shipments Faces Legal
Snags from U.S., EEC Systems, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 199 (May 13, 1987);
Governing Council Endorses Blueprint for Development into Twenty-First Century, 10
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 314 (July 8, 1987); U.S. Position Seen Jeopardizing Work on
Transboundary Waste Shipments, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 371 (Aug. 12, 1987); No
Progress Reported From OECD Session on Regulating Transport of Hazardous
Waste, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 580 (Nov. 11, 1987); Lykke, Outgoing OECD Offi-
cial, Urges Change in Viewing Transboundary Problems, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 651
(Dec. 9, 1987). OECD officials have recently termed the Basel Convention an interim
step, with the real goal being waste minimization. OECD Official Says Basel Conven-
tion Interim Step in Governments' Waste Efforts, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 542
(Nov. 8, 1989).
115. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (explaining that the manifest
must describe the waste and accompany it at all times).
116. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (describing the contents of the
consignment note, including destination route, and source).
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ruptive as it could delay or interfere with shipments. At the same time,
the Basel Convention mandates such consent.11  To accommodate both
concerns, some OECD officials have proposed applying different rules
for shipments outside the OECD from those within the OECD.
D. WORLD BANK REQUIREMENTS
The World Bank provides developing countries with loans to assist in
economic development projects. As part of each loan, the World Bank
prescribes environmental guidelines. Failure to satisfy these require-
ments can result in the termination of funding. World Bank regulations
forbid the export of hazardous waste in any project that it funds.'1 8
The Bank will not finance any project that involves disposal of hazard-
ous waste from another country, nor will it pay for the shipment or
disposal of any hazardous waste in any developing country." 9 The
World Bank further urges that others limit hazardous waste exports to
those instances in which environmentally sound transportation and dis-
posal requirements will be met and only after prior informed consent
has been provided by the receiving country. 20
III. BASEL CONVENTION
A. HISTORY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT
In 1987, UNEP adopted the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes (Cairo
Guidelines), which set forth recommendations regarding the export of
hazardous waste.' 2' The Cairo Guidelines call for notification to receiv-
ing and transit nations of any export and consent by those nations prior
to export. The exporter is to ensure that the disposal site is adequate to
handle the hazardous waste and that disposal complies with require-
ments at least as stringent as those in the exporting nation.2 2
Following the adoption of the Cairo Guidelines, UNEP sought to
embody similar principles in a Convention.12 3 Work began with an or-
117. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 6, para. 4.
118. World Bank News Release 89/51.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management
and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes, UNEP/WG. 122/3 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter
Cairo Guidelines].
122. Id.
123. At the time it adopted the Cairo Guidelines, the UNEP Governing Council
authorized the formation of an ad hoc working group of legal and technical experts to
develop a Convention on hazardous waste export.
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ganizational meeting in Budapest, Hungary, in October 1987. Conflict-
ing views on major matters impeded reaching an agreement. Some
countries pressed for a complete ban on the trade of hazardous waste,
while others urged for minimal regulation.1 2'
The debate ultimately focused, however, on several issues, the pri-
mary one being the nature of regulation. In particular, considerable
discussion addressed what waste to regulate. Views differed substan-
tially as to what notice or information about the waste should be pro-
vided to receiving nations. The participants also disagreed over what
consent was required before an export occurred. While some countries
pushed for written consent before export, others maintained that such
consent should be implied if no response was received within a certain
time period. The member states also debated what rights to extend to
transit nations. Should such nations be required to provide written con-
sent, implied consent, or no consent? In defining the territory of a
transit state, how are territorial waters to be determined? Finally, the
participants struggled with enforcement alternatives. How would the
Convention be enforced? Who would oversee enforcement? What sanc-
tions should be imposed?
B. TERMS OF THE CONVENTION
The Basel Convention regulates, rather than bans, the export of haz-
ardous waste. The Convention provides for a management scheme very
similar to the approach employed in the United States and the EC.
Accordingly, implementation may encounter many of the same short-
comings these other export programs have confronted.
The Basel Convention applies to the export of "hazardous wastes"
and "other wastes."125 Hazardous wastes are defined to include certain
listed wastes and waste streams. 26 Such a listed waste is not a hazard-
ous waste, however, unless it displays one of the "hazardous character-
istics" delineated in an Annex III to the Convention. 27 A waste, there-
fore, must be both a listed waste and have some hazardous
characteristic to be defined as a hazardous waste. In addition, any
waste defined by law in an exporting, importing, or transit country as a
124. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that most developing coun-
tries demanded prior informed consent before allowing transhipment).
125. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 1, 2.
126. Id. at Annex I (defining waste streams-such as medical wastes, pharmaceuti-
cal wastes, mining wastes, chemical wastes- and specific wastes--such as lead, asbes-
tos, inorganic cyanides).
127. Id. at Annex III (listing a variety of "hazardous characteristics"-such as
flammability and toxicity).
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hazardous waste is also a hazardous waste.1 28 "Other wastes" include
any specifically listed wastes on Annex II to the Convention. 2"
The Basel Convention forbids the export of any hazardous or other
waste until the importing and transit nations have provided written au-
thorization. 13 As part of that authorization, the importing nation must
confirm the existence of a contract between the "exporter and the dis-
poser specifying environmentally sound management of the wastes in
question."' 131
To receive such authorization, an exporter must provide written noti-
fication to the designated "competent authority"1 32 of the importing na-
tion and of any other nation through which the waste will be trans-
ported.1 33 The notification must include specified information about
such things as the nature and amount of the waste, the waste genera-
tor, and the ultimate disposal. 34 The export may not commence until
the transit and importing countries agree in writing to the export. 30 In
addition to approving the request, the transit and importing countries
are authorized to deny permission, request additional information, or
approve subject to specified conditions. 38 Although a transit country is
to respond within sixty days, a time deadline is inapplicable to the im-
porting nation's response. 37
Once export approval is provided, the export may occur. A document
detailing the waste, comparable to the manifest or uniform consign-
ment note, must accompany the waste at all times. 38 Insurance and
other financial assurance requirements also apply to movement of the
waste. 139 Once disposal is complete, the disposer must notify the ex-
porter and the exporting nation. 40 If, for whatever reason, the waste is
128. Id. art. 1, para. 1(b). Every signatory is to provide a list of such wastes to
UNEP within six months of signing the convention. Id. art. 1.
129. Id. at Annex II (listing two wastes: wastes collected from households and resi-
dues arising from the incineration of household wastes).
130. Id. art. 6.
131. Id. art. 6, para. 3(b).
132. Id. art. 5, (providing for each nation to identify a "competent authority,"
along with the "focal point" to act as the contact point for all matters, filings, and
requests related to the export of hazardous waste).
133. Id. art. 6, para. 1.
134. Id. art. 6 (providing that an exporter is to provide the information identified
on Annex V(A)). Annex V(A) contains twenty-one separate items. Id. at Annex V(A).
135. Id. art. 6, para. 3.
136. Id. art. 6.
137. Id. art. 6, para. 4, 3(b).
138. Id. art. 6, para. 9 (stating that the movement document must be signed upon
delivery or receipt of wastes by each person who takes charge of such waste).
139. Id. art. 6, para. 11.
140. Id. art. 6, para. 9.
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not or cannot be imported or disposed of, the exporting nation must
accept the waste."'
The Basel Convention specifies that no country shall export to a
country which has prohibited imports of particular wastes."4 2 Signato-
ries of the Convention are also precluded from exporting to nonsignato-
ries.143 Exports between countries that would otherwise be banned,
however, may occur if a bilateral agreement permits such export."4' In
such cases, the agreements are to conform to sound waste management
principles.
C. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
Fundamental questions surround implementation of the Basel Con-
vention. Any export program must address what waste is to be
regulated, how it is to be regulated, what information is to be provided
to other countries, and how to monitor and enforce any such program.
Yet, in most respects, the Convention largely tracks the requirements
of the United States and EC export programs. The perceived failures of
these programs, however, was what triggered the adoption of the Con-
vention. In fact, with the extension of the export program to additional
countries, most of which lack the expertise and infrastructure found in
the developed countries, the likelihood for confusion and problems may
be expanded by the Convention.
1. Need for Harmonization of Definitions and Standards
Any international agreement must provide for uniform treatment of
hazardous waste by its signatories. Varying interpretations and diverg-
ing export programs in different countries precludes the effective
implementation of an international accord. Furthermore, harmoniza-
tion of requirements and standardization of terminology aids imple-
mentation." 5 In an effort to provide such standardization, the OECD
has proposed guidelines and standards for worldwide applicability to
multinational corporations., 6 The Basel Convention has not achieved
141. Id. art. 8.
142. Id. art. 4, para. l(b).
143. Id. art. 7.
144. Id. art. II.
145. Handl, Environmental Protection and Development in Third World Coun-
tries: Common Destiny-Common Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & PoL. 603,
619-20 (1988).
146. Id.; Comment, U.S. Controls on International Disposal, supra note 6, at 784-
85 (stating OECD has developed specific guidelines for multinational enterprises to
avoid environmental risks associated with hazardous waste); Bailey & Nanda, supra
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such uniformity. As such, it will leave interpretation of the myriad re-
quirements up to the discretion of the individual nation. In particular,
the definition of hazardous waste is of paramount importance as it de-
termines what wastes are subject to the Convention. The definition
must not be so broad as to include products not appropriate for regula-
tion nor so narrow as to exempt dangerous waste.
Unfortunately, virtually every existing export program has defined
hazardous waste differently. What is a hazardous waste in one country
is often not a hazardous waste for its neighbor. Even among the indus-
trialized countries, the meaning of hazardous waste varies dramati-
cally. For example, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the
United States, and the United Kingdom all rely on different lists or
criteria for determining what is a hazardous waste..1 7 The different
definitions of hazardous waste have hindered implementation of the EC
directive on transboundary movement of hazardous waste. Some coun-
tries have pointed to confusion surrounding the definition of hazardous
waste as the reason for failing to adopt implementing regulations.
Other countries have dropped enforcement actions finding that the defi-
nition was sufficiently ambiguous to preclude effective enforcement. In
short, without a certain definition of hazardous waste, the Convention
will face severe implementation problems.
Beyond what wastes are identified as hazardous, each program must
wrestle with how much of any listed waste renders it a hazardous waste
for purposes of regulation. Does any trace amount of a listed waste in a
substance categorize that waste as a hazardous waste, or must the
amount of the listed substance exceed some threshold level? Does it
depend on the substance? Similarly, if a waste is mixed with a nonhaz-
ardous waste or if it is to be recycled, when does it cease to be a haz-
ardous waste? Mixed and recycled wastes may not need to be regulated
in the same fashion as hazardous waste. At the same time mixing or
recycling classifications may exempt dangerous waste from regulation
if not defined carefully. For example, the German company Weber,
note 6, at 159-60 (discussing OECD rules for standard terminology and procedures to
harmonize international requirements).
147. See, Yakowitz, Identifying, Clarifying, and Describing Hazardous Wastes, 11
INDUSTRY & ENV'T 3 (Jan.-Mar. 1980) (available from UNEP, Washington, D.C.);
Prabhu, Toxic Chemicals and Hazardous Wastes: An Overview of National and Inter-
national Regulatory Programs, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 692 (Dec. 14, 1988) (dis-
cussing the various definitions of hazardous waste among developed countries such as
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany); see also Britain
to Pressure, supra note 100, at 443 (discussing Great Britain's efforts for clarification
of movement of waste); Comment, U.S. Controls on International Disposal, supra note
6, at 776 n.8 (stating that nonuniformity of treatment and disposal standards causes
exports of hazardous waste within Europe).
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Ltd. lawfully mixed woodchips with hazardous waste, thereby trans-
forming a "hazardous waste" into a "burn material" exempt from the
definition of hazardous waste in Germany and allowing for vastly more
inexpensive disposal.148 This waste was exported to Turkey, where it sat
in the open leaching PCB's mixed with woodchips into the ground.24
Without clarity and uniformity in the Convention as to when wastes
are hazardous mixtures or recycled, implementation will be difficult.
Similarly, the definition of hazardous waste must distinguish between
those substances that are wastes and those that are products. Many
products contain listed hazardous substances. A hazardous waste ex-
port program is not intended to regulate products.1 50 Accordingly, the
definition of hazardous waste must differentiate products from hazard-
ous waste.
As part of the determination of wastes to be regulated, sampling and
analysis methods for the waste must be specified. Differing laboratory
protocols will produce different analytic results. Absent uniformity of
such standards and measurement methods, a waste could be analyzed
in two different countries with different conclusions as to whether it is
hazardous.
Unfortunately, the Convention has not effectively resolved any of
these questions. In particular, the meanings of waste, hazardous waste,
and recycled materials are unsettled and, therefore, governed by the
subjective determination of each individual country."01 Standard ana-
lytic or sampling methodologies are not specified in the Convention.
10 2
As a result, it will be unclear whether many wastes are subject to the
Convention.
The Basel Convention defines wastes as substances or objects which
are intended to be or actually are disposed." In turn, disposal refers to
any operation listed on an Annex to the Convention.'" That Annex
lists fifteen different types of "disposal" activities (such as deposit into
or onto land, land treatment, deep injection, or surface impound-
ment).15 5 A waste, therefore, is any substance that is disposed of
148. Anderson, supra note 18, at 67.
149. Id.
150. See Lutz, The Export of Danger: A View from the Developed World, 20
INT'L L. & POL. 629, 644-43 (1988) (stating that the export of products is governed by
a combination of federal statutes and agency regulations).
151. Developed, Developing Countries, supra note 3, at 376.
152. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 4, para. 8.
153. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
154. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
155. Id. Annex IV. The United States has struggled with the meaning of "dis-
carded." Comment, U.S. Controls on International Disposal, supra note 6, at 783
n.83.
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through one of the specifically identified activities. These specific activi-
ties listed, however, are not defined. Absent further guidance by
UNEP, each country will determine whether a particular activity in-
volves disposal. Different countries are likely to reach conflicting con-
clusions about whether a material is a waste because the descriptions of
these activities are general.
The definition of hazardous waste is similarly flawed. "Hazardous
waste" includes any waste that falls within a list provided in Annex I to
the Convention, unless that waste does not possess any of the charac-
teristics described in Annex III.1"6 A "hazardous waste" also means
any waste considered hazardous by law in the country of export, im-
port, or transit.1 57 In effect, the Convention defines hazardous waste as
those wastes that fall within one of the specifically listed categories of
waste in Annex I, or as defined by one of the countries affected by the
export.
Annex I contains two lists: waste streams and specific substances." 8
First, the waste stream list includes such wastes as clinical waste from
hospitals, pharmaceutical waste, and waste from wood preserving
chemical operations. 159 No guidance or instructions, however, explain
how to interpret these general categories. Thus, countries are likely to
reach different conclusions about whether a waste is covered. Second,
the specific substances include a number of constituents. 6" There is no
indication, however, as to the amount of any of these substances that
must be present in a waste in order for it to be hazardous.
Moreover, a specifically listed waste stream or hazardous substance
is not hazardous if the waste does not display any of the characteristics
identified in Annex III.6' Annex III lists a number of hazardous char-
acteristics, such as flammability, corrosivity, and explosiveness. 16 2 As
with the other definitions, these are general and imprecise. The failure
to identify analytic and measurement methodologies is particularly
troublesome in this area. The determination of such qualities as flam-
mability and corrosivity is not clear cut. Without guidelines to interpret
these characteristics, countries will reach varying conclusions about
whether or not a waste is hazardous.
Hazardous materials that are to be recycled are exempted from the
156. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 1.
157. Id.
158. Id. at Annex I.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. art. 1, para. I(a).
162. Id. Annex III.
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definition of hazardous waste.16 3 As with the other key terms, UNEP
provides a list of activities to define recycled."" Similarly, the absence
of clarity about the meaning of recycled will impede implementation of
the Convention. Finally, the Convention does not address the dilemma
posed by distinguishing products from wastes.
In short, the definition of hazardous waste is imprecise. Without cer-
tainty on this fundamental point, the Convention may be
unenforceable.
2. Disclosure of Information
The Convention requires the exporting nation to give written notifi-
cation to the importing nation and the latter to consent to receive the
waste.165 The notification must identify the nature and quantity of the
waste to be exported. 6 The nature of the waste is to be described with
reference to its most hazardous substance concentrations.6 7 The appli-
cable hazardous categories listed in Annex I are to be identified."6 8
Notification may be insufficient to enable a receiving country to de-
termine the desirability of accepting the waste. Mere reference to the
categories of waste streams and substances listed in Annex I raises the
comparable concerns discussed with respect to the definition of hazard-
ous waste. Describing a waste as a pharmaceutical waste does not con-
vey sufficient information to determine the disposal needs of the waste.
Disclosure of the most hazardous components of the waste provides
some additional insight into the proper method of disposal of the waste.
However, even this information may be lacking. For example, of the
48,000 chemicals listed with EPA, little is known about the toxicity of
38,000 of them.6 9 In effect, the appropriate handling and disposal for
many wastes may not be clear. Further, even if the dangers of the sub-
stances are known, without assessing them in relation to the remainder
of the composition of the waste, the recipient may be misled about the
disposal needs for the waste. Moreover, if there are risks, notice about
how to handle the waste may not filter down to the disposal facility
because the notice is provided to the government and not to the
facility.170
163. Id. Annex IV(B).
164. Id.
165. Id. art. 6, Annex V.
166. Id.
167. Id. Annex V(A)(17).
168. Id.
169. Langone, supra note 14, at 47.
170. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 6; see Halter, Regulating Information
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Conversely, the receiving country is to assure the exporting nation
that the facility is competent to accept the wastes. 171 The information
that must be communicated back to the exporting nation, however,
provides little basis to evaluate the ability of the facility to handle the
waste. The information flow in both directions, therefore, is not suffi-
cient to allow for reasoned judgment.
Moreover, even if the content of the required notices is adequate, the
developing countries may be unable to act on the information. Many
developing countries lack the resources, expertise, or infrastructure to
make a proper assessment.17 1 Similar information disclosure and label-
ing requirement programs, including those of the United Nations, have
been found wanting. 73 Without transferring the technology to the
developing world to evaluate the information, "informed" consent may
be a mirage. In light of the difficulties experienced in the other United
Nations information programs and the expertise gap between exporter
and importer, the hazardous waste export program is likely to encoun-
ter a similar fate. Partly because of this problem, developing countries
have pushed for the transfer of technology of the waste exporting coun-
try to ensure for proper disposal. 74 The Convention does not impose
such a requirement.
In short, the Convention provides inadequate assurances that the
exporting country will provide sufficient meaningful information to the
receiving nation to allow for an informed decision about the proper dis-
posal of the waste. Similarly, the importing country may not know or
disclose enough information about the disposal facility to enable the
exporting nation to conclude that it is a proper facility. Without dis-
closure of such necessary information and the capacity to evaluate it,
there is a high likelihood of disposal in facilities ill-equipped to handle
Exchange and International Trade in Pesticides and Other Toxic Substances to Meet
the Needs of Developing Countries, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 20 (1987) (noting that in
developing countries, governments often lack the resources to supply necessary infor-
mation about hazardous substances to the facility handling the materials).
171. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 4, para. 2(b).
172. UNEP Transboundary Transport Draft, supra note 3, at 660; Handl, supra
note 145, at 616.
173. Judy, supra note 14, at 172-75; Comment, Exporting Hazardous Industries:
Should American Standards Apply, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 785 (1988); Com-
ment, Hazardous Exports to the Third World: The Need to Abolish the Double Stan-
dard, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 71 (1987) (discussing the benefits of a reciprocal system
of regulating export of toxic and/or hazardous substances to other foreign nations).
The United- Nations and other international disclosure programs importing hazardous
substances, chemicals, and pesticides have been criticized for the communication of
complex information of little value.
174. Developed, Developing Countries, supra note 3, at 376; Western, African Na-





Transit nations, through which the waste travels to its ultimate dis-
posal, are to be notified of the export and must provide consent.1 75 For
purposes of the Basel Convention, the boundaries of the transit nation
include territorial waters.176 Where there are disputes concerning terri-
torial waters, however, it is unclear which definition applies. A number
of nations disagree over the scope of the territorial waters of individual
nations. 7 Under the present plan, there may be disagreements as to
whether notice must be provided and consent obtained for an export.7 8
4. Monitoring and Enforcement
Apart from the definition of hazardous waste, the most important
potential shortcoming in the Convention involves the provisions for
monitoring compliance and enforcement. The Convention provides for a
Secretariat to oversee implementation of the Convention. 7" The extent
to which the Secretariat is able to monitor compliance with the provi-
sions of the Convention, however, is unclear. The principal responsibil-
ity of the Secretariat is to facilitate the flow of information, not to doc-
ument compliance, even though much discussion centered on the need
for the Secretariat to perform such a role. 180 Without such monitoring,
countries may not comply with the Convention.
Even if the Secretariat did monitor for noncompliance, enforcement
provisions within the Convention are inadequate. The Basel Convention
directs parties to arbitrate disputes, including, presumably, noncompli-
ance."'' If dispute resolution fails, a party may pursue the matter by
bringing it before the International Court of Justice.182 Past experience,
however, has found both the use of arbitration and the International
Court of Justice to be wanting. 1 ' 3 In addition to the low number of
175. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 6, para. 4.
176. Id. art. 2(9).
177. UNEP Transboundary Transport, supra note 3, at 660-61.
178. Western, African Nations, supra note 3, at 50.
179. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 16; see Geneva Selected as Site for
Agency to Monitor Toxic Waste Disposal Convention, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 240
(May 10, 1989) (discussing the administrative procedures for establishing the
Secretariat).
180. Developed, Developing Countries, supra note 3, at 376-77.
181. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note I, art. 20, Annex VI, para. 1.
182. Id. art. 20, para. 2.
183. Doolittle, Underestimating Ozone Depletion: The Meandering Road to the
Montreal Protocol and Beyond, 16 EcOLOGY L.Q. 407, 431 (1989); Comment, Trans-
1990]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
environmental cases taken ,to the Court,"" the Court may rule on a
case only if the parties consent to such jurisdiction.185 To date, only
twenty-four nations have agreed to do so.1 86 Thus, the dispute resolu-
tion mechanism is inadequate.
Conceivably, UNEP itself could function as a superenforcement
agency. Others have urged that environmental groups function as
guardians of international accords. 87 While environmental groups may
have standing in various individual nations to bring suit, however, they
lack standing in the International Court of Justice.1 88 In this instance,
the participants apparently prefer to resolve their disputes them-
selves.18 Disputes and noncompliance problems arising under the Con-
vention, at best, are likely to be handled by informal channels directly
between the complaining countries. Such an arrangement, however,
cannot reach all problems. If a transporter dumps waste during transit,
but outside the territorial waters of any individual nation, it is unclear
which nations could object to that disposal. Because of the ICJ's stand-
ing requirements, which predicates jurisdiction on injury to a "legally
protected interest," few nations may be authorized to bring the of-
fender to court.' 90 Ultimately, countries will comply with the Conven-
tion only to the extent that any individual country chooses to abide by
the terms of the Convention.
5. Liability
The Basel Convention sidestepped the question of liability for haz-
ardous waste exports. The Convention provides that the parties are to
cooperate to develop a protocol to establish rules and procedures for
liability and damages arising from the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes,' 9' but it does not answer the question of who should
pay for any damages.
Ironically, the very problem that triggered enactment of the Conven-
frontier Pollution and the International Joint Commission: A Superior Means of Dis-
pute Resolution, 17 Sw. U.L. REV. 43 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Transfrontier
Pollution].
184. Comment, Transfrontier Pollution, supra note 183, at 45.
185. Id. at 47.
186. Id.
187. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 393, 394 (1989). In fact, NRDC has been very active in seeking to enforce the
Montreal Protocol. Doolittle, supra note 183, at 434-36.
188. Sands, supra note 187, at 394.
189. Bailey & Nanda, supra note 6, at 159; Waste Shipment Incidents, supra note
3, at 472.
190. Comment, Transfrontier Pollution, supra note 183, at 47-48.
191. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 12.
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tion-responsibility for inappropriate disposal of the waste-went un-
resolved. Although the exporting country must readmit the waste, the
larger question of who will pay the cost associated with cleaning up of
the problem remains unaddressed. 192 If the receiving country has con-
sented to the acceptance of the waste, however, it would appear unrea-
sonable to impose the cost of remedying any disposal problems on the
exporting country. Thus, as would appear likely to happen when devel-
oping countries receive waste and are unable to dispose of it properly,
the receiving country is likely to bear the cost of the clean up. The
Convention, therefore, may not reduce the risk for reeiving countries
of accepting hazardous waste for disposal.
Increasingly, individual nations have been held responsible (and
therefore liable) for conduct which injures neighboring nations.293 Any
such liability, however, terminates if the injured nation knows of or
accepts the activity that resulted in the injury.194 Once an importing
country knowingly accepts a waste, that country is responsible for it.
This shift in liability emphasizes the shortcomings of the definitions of
hazardous waste and the completeness of the information provided to
importing nations. The assumption of responsibility based on consent
could disparately affect developing countries. It would appear unwise,
however, to impose a different or double standard with respect to these
countries.1 95 In any case, nations are likely to disagree over the suffi-
ciency of the information provided to an importing country, as a means
to avoid financial responsibility.
Although the Convention regulates governmental action, some ob-
servers have questioned the wisdom of imposing fault on nations rather
than on a multinational company that actually violates the Conven-
tion.196 Alternatively, multinationals could be regulated directly. In this
instance, however, each individual nation has the authority to regulate
the companies within its jurisdiction. Therefore, each nation could ef-
fectively shift responsibility to a multinational company whose conduct
exposed the nation to liability.
Finally, the Convention neglected to decide whether liability should
be strict or based on fault.19 7 Causation could impose unwarranted bur-
192. Id. art. 8.
193. Bailey & Nanda, supra note 6, at 159-60, 179-80; Judy, supra note 14, at
169-70.
194. Bailey & Nanda, supra note 6, at 159-60, 179-80.
195. Handl & Lutz, An International Policy Perspective on the Trade of Hazard-
ous Materials and Technologies, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 351, 361-642 (1989).
196. Id. at 355; Handl, supra note 145, at 623-26; Lutz, supra note 150, at 638-40.
197. Western, African Nations, supra note 3, at 50. The failure to address the
liability issues has led to difficulties in remedying recent transboundary damage dis-
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dens on enforcement, but strict liability would dramatically modify the
liability schemes of most countries and would have an impact far be-
yond the export of hazardous waste. As with other liability issues, the
Convention needs to resolve the applicable liability theories.
6. Bilateral Agreements
The Convention allows for individual nations to reach bilateral
agreements or multinational agreements to govern the export and im-
port of hazardous waste between those nations.198 Such agreements are
to be consistent with the terms and principles of the Convention. 9 It is
unclear, however, by what mechanism UNEP will assure that such
agreements, in fact, conform to the Convention." Moreover, it is even
less clear how UNEP will insure that the shipments of waste actually
conform to that bilateral agreement. Countries are likely to be
unenthusiastic about UNEP or any other international entity interven-
ing in bilateral agreements.
7. Role of UNEP
Pervading the concerns about implementation of the Convention is
the matter of what role UNEP will perform with respect to the Con-
vention. UNEP could function principally as an information facilitator
providing data to countries about wastes and disposal methods. UNEP
could also create an inspection and certification system. Additionally,
UNEP could standardize definitions and interpretations. Moreover,
UNEP could assist in the transfer of technology. Finally, UNEP could
act as a superenforcement agency insuring and enforcing compliance.
UNEP's decision with respect to its role will likely determine the effec-
tiveness of the implementation of the Convention.
Certainly, UNEP has accomplished much by the Convention. Over
100 nations are in general agreement about the need for and nature of
an international program to regulate the export of hazardous waste. 0 1
Despite its apparent shortcomings, the Convention will enhance ex-
change of information about the nature of hazardous wastes and tech-
nologies for their disposal and treatment. Ultimately, the Convention
putes. Handl, supra note 145, at 626.
198. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 11.
199. Id.
200. See Waste-Watching, supra note 16, at 44 (stating that Western Europe pres-
ently ships substantial quantities of waste to East Germany). It is unclear how UNEP
intends to oversee such arrangements.
201. Thirty-four Countries, supra note 1, at 160.
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may expedite the transfer of treatment technologies. Most importantly,
the Convention identifies hazardous waste movement as an important
issue and begins the arduous task of tracking the global movement of
hazardous waste.
